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Abstract: This essay provides a multidimensional reading of Adamson Mushala’s 
insurgency, the only significant internal armed rebellion against the post-colonial Zambian 
state. It circumvents the standard depiction of Mushala’s guerrillas as South African-
sponsored “bandits” and contends that their movement must be understood as the precipitate 
of the complex interaction between local, national and regional political dynamics. While the 
origins of the rebellion are to be sought in the tension between the United National 
Independence Party and supporters of Katanga in the Lunda district of Mwinilunga in the 
early 1960s, the adoption of a military strategy on Mushala’s part was a direct consequence of 
the increasingly authoritarian and unpopular nature of UNIP’s rule during Zambia’s First 
Republic (1964-1972) and the coeval manoeuvres of Portugal and South Africa. The paper 
ends with an examination of Mushala’s war in the North-Western Province from 1976 and the 
threat it posed to the fragile hegemony of the Zambian one-party state. 
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Between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, Adamson Mushala led the only significant 
internal armed rebellion against the post-colonial Zambian state. While making no substantial 
military gains, Mushala succeeded in destabilising the North-Western Province, the site of his 
insurgency, and creating an atmosphere of fear and paranoia among local and national leaders 
of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). Despite his notoriety during his life 
and continuing place in the memory of the peoples of the North-Western Province, Mushala 
has hitherto existed on the margins of post-colonial southern African history, mentioned in 
passing and in relation only to subjects more pressing to – and better understood by – the 
authors concerned.
1
 Building on Patrick Wele’s little-known study,
2
 and making use of a large 
body of untapped archival and oral sources in both Zambia and South Africa, this essay 
circumvents the standard, superficial depiction of Mushala as a South African-sponsored 
“terrorist” and “bandit” and contends that his insurgency must be viewed as the precipitate of 
the complex interaction between local, national and regional forces and structures.  
The Zambian post-colonial state, its artificial borders drawn across powerful ethno-
linguistic territories and identities, was threatened by the enduring relevance of such 
allegiances. Mushala capitalized on the strength of local systems of ethnic affiliation, 
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 3 
following in the footsteps of chiefly authorities who had expressed their rejection of UNIP’s 
national project by leading their people across the barely visible colonial borders separating an 
enduring Lunda polity or “commonwealth.”
3
 But his rebellion was also fired by the 
increasingly manifest failure of the independent Zambian state to fulfil its people’s 
expectations of national social and economic development. He and his supporters consistently 
acted and saw themselves as the spokesmen of the neglected peoples of the North-Western 
Province. Finally, the regional (and, during the Cold War, global) dimension of the rebellion 
stemmed from a geopolitical context in which covert diplomacy and destabilization were the 
principal means by which the surviving colonial powers and settler regimes – Portugal, 
Rhodesia and South Africa – sought to neutralize the liberation struggles waged by armed 
movements operating out of Zambia and other “frontline states.”  
Adopting an anti-Communist rhetoric, and striving to manoeuvre in a shadowy world 
of armchair conspirators, cynical intelligence agents and gung-ho military instructors, 
Mushala and his allies made temporary common cause with the regional enemies of the 
UNIP-dominated state. In the event, however, the changing profile of South Africa’s foreign 
policy and its détente initiatives towards Zambia frustrated and even threatened Mushala’s 
capacity to wage his war. Mushala’s struggle within Zambia, from 1976 to 1982, was fought 
largely without external support. The insurgency was thus more notable for its political impact 
than its military significance. For no matter how ineffective and circumscribed, its very 
existence presented a threat to the fragile hegemony of the Zambian one-party state, rooted as 
it was in UNIP’s claim to speak on behalf of all Zambian peoples. UNIP perceived the 
rebellion as evidence of the disloyalty of the peoples of the North-Western Province and 
feared its diffusion elsewhere in the country. Although hemmed in to a provincial base and 
reliant on the use of violence, Mushala briefly advanced an alternative vision of independent 
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Zambia based on revitalised chiefly authority, capitalist free enterprise, and Western 
democratic values. For some Zambians, Mushala’s ragged band of fighters, inspired 
simultaneously by anti-Communism, post-colonial economic discontent and the power of 
magic, were heroes who resisted the one-party state and, in so doing, paved the way for the 
pro-democracy movement of 1990-91. 
 
 
Local Roots: The ANC in Mwinilunga District and the Mayouth (1960-71) 
 
Even though Kaonde malcontents in the early post-Independence era could draw upon a long 
tradition of heroic criminality,
4
 the immediate local antecedents of the Mushala rebellion are 
not to be found in present-day Mufumbwe district, whence Adamson originated, but in the 
neighbouring Lunda district of Mwinilunga (see map). In the early 1960s, this strategically 
important area, a British salient wedged in between newly-independent Congo and Portuguese 
Angola, was one of the few Northern Rhodesian localities not to be won over by the radical 
version of nationalism espoused by Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP. 
[Insert map somewhere here] 
For the old and widely respected Senior Chief, Kanongesha Ndembi,
5
 the notions of 
independent nationhood and “Zambia” had a much less tangible appeal than the revamped 
Lunda mystique brought about by the ongoing Katanga secession and the promise of an 
                                                 
4
 Consider, e.g., the exploits of Tumiwa Sakutenuka in 1911, as recounted by S.J. Chibanza, “Formation of the 
Kasempa Chieftainship,” in idem, Central Bantu Historical Texts I. Part II: Kaonde History (Lusaka, 1961), 70-
77. 
5
 In 1959, the district commissioner, Mwinilunga, “put his age between 65 and 70” and described him as 
“popular with his people … because he [did] not ‘trouble them.’” Mwinilunga Tour Report, 9, 1959, SEC 2/967, 
National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), Lusaka. 
 5 
ethnically-inspired redrawing of the geopolitical map of Central Africa that it seemed to hold 
out.
6
 From the beginning of the secession (July 1960), Katangese dignitaries appear to have 
been in touch with Ndembi and a number of his sub-chiefs. In May 1961, a Mr. “Ja-a 
Tshilembe,” a Lusaka-based associate of Moïse Tshombe, the Katangese President, visited the 
senior chief and other Lunda authorities in the North-Western Province with a view to 
soliciting support for the secession.
7
 This – as later reports from the area suggest – may have 
entailed the recruitment of “men for the Katanga army.”
8
 Shortly thereafter, Tshombe’s ethnic 
message was brought to the border area between Katanga and the North-Western Province by 
none other than the then holder of the highest Lunda political title, the Mwata Yamvo, with 
which the Kanongeshas had maintained close relationships for almost two centuries.
9
  
Kanongesha Ndembi was not the only resident of Mwinilunga with a vested interest in 
events across the Katangese frontier. Local representatives of the nearly bankrupt African 
National Congress (ANC) – Harry Nkumbula’s party, from which UNIP (and its short-lived 
predecessor, the Zambia African National Congress) had sprung in 1958-9 – were quick to 
identify in Tshombe a potential ally in their uphill struggle against the unquestionably 
stronger, richer and better organized UNIP. Given the latter party’s explicit Lumumbist 
sympathies, anti-secessionist stance and appraisal of Tshombe and his “murderous-ministers” 
as “imperialist puppet[s],”
10
 it is hardly surprising that Katangese authorities felt favourably 
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inclined towards the ANC’s overtures. Accompanied by Tshilembe, Ronald John Japau, the 
ANC’s provincial general secretary in the North-Western Province, visited Katanga in May 
1961.
11
 At the beginning of August, Japau had yet to make his way back to Mwinilunga, 
having been delayed by Tshombe’s promise of “some valuable goods to help the ANC 
activities.”
12
 As a result of Japau’s exertions in Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), as many as five 




Their common alliance with Tshombe strengthened the link between the Lunda of 
Kanongesha and the ANC. As early as the beginning of 1961, Japau felt able to reassure 
Nkumbula to the effect that the only followers of UNIP in Mwinilunga were people who had 
“come for work, Kaondes, Bembas, etc. not the Lundas, there are very few Lundas.”
14
 As the 
“‘Lunda-speaking people” learnt to “support ANC just as one supports his family,”
15
 
Kanongesha Ndembi became the bête noir of UNIP’s organizers in Mwinilunga. Ever keen 
publicly to condemn UNIP’s activities in his district, he even refused to grant Kaunda an 
audience when the latter visited his capital in June 1962.
16
 Ndembi’s ethnic exclusiveness 
(what a district commissioner [hereafter DC] called his “conceit and … sense of his own 
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importance as Senior Chief”
17
) and the ANC’s openly chauvinistic message on the eve of the 
first Northern Rhodesian general elections of October 1962 fed upon each other. Ndembi and 
most other Lunda chiefs of Mwinilunga – wrote the then deputy provincial president of the 
ANC – were “sorry and ashamed” to be 
 
hated by other Chiefs, Government and UNIP because that they are the Chiefs who have made ANC to be 
strong. Even so they said they can not stop it because they are the people of Mwantiyamvwa not from the 




Thanks to Tshombe’s resources, Kanongesha Ndembi’s partisanship and Japau and his 
associates’ organizational abilities and selective use of violence against UNIP, Mwinilunga 
remained an ANC island in a sea of UNIP.
19
 In the general elections of 20 January 1964 – 
when Congress only managed to win ten out of the 65 seats available to African parties – 
Japau defeated Peter Matoka, the UNIP candidate, and was returned to Parliament with a 
comfortable majority. Despite UNIP’s countrywide electoral success, the new rulers of 
independent Zambia were profoundly disturbed by their fiasco in Mwinilunga.
20
 For not only 
did Mwinilunga abut the potentially explosive Zambian borders with the Congo and Angola, 
but the rejection of UNIP by the Lunda of the district also militated against the party’s 
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sustained efforts to present itself as the sole legitimate embodiment of the blossoming nation 
and to portray the ANC as a moribund tribal organization, limited to the Tonga-speaking 
areas of the Central and Southern Provinces.  
Following the elections, the direction of political violence in Mwinilunga changed 
abruptly, and the ANC found itself on the receiving end of an aggressive campaign of 
intimidation of the part of UNIP. On 22 January, as Kaunda was being sworn in as prime 
minister, UNIP activists in chief Ntambo’s area assaulted ANC’s members, leaving four of 
their number “badly beaten up and injured.”
21
 Strong pressures were brought to bear on Japau 
to cross the floor and join the ruling party. When Japau stood firm, UNIP youths went on the 
rampage in his home village near the Kampemba stream. They “started beating the people and 
burned houses and ended in assassination of Philip Samubaza Malichi of Mwinilunga village 
by shooting him with bow and arrows … and the culprits were not arrested.”
22
 Kanongesha 
Ndembi, who was perhaps underestimating UNIP’s determination to “crush and smash” the 
ANC in Mwinilunga,
23
 remained defiant to the end. As late as June 1964, he was still urging 
his people “to kill all UNIP” and declaring “that he was a 100% ANC member.”
24
 But for all 
his bombast, the old chief’s days were now numbered. Sometime in November 1965, having 
been openly threatened with deposition on several occasions, Ndembi and a sizeable group of 
his followers (variously estimated at between “some hundreds” and several “thousands”) 
crossed the border into neighbouring Lunda areas of Angola, just as a menacing motorcade 
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led by Resident Minister H.M. Kikombe, and consisting of “all Chiefs, elected Councillors, 
Police, Messengers, Party Officials and Party Youths,” was approaching its capital.
25
 
It is likely that Ndembi or some of his closest advisers had already established contact 
with Portuguese authorities before their hurried flight to Angola. For after the death of the 
senior chief in a road accident at the end of December 1965, the Lunda exiles – now under the 
leadership of John Samawino, one of the late chief’s councillors and the ANC’s provincial 
general secretary since Japau’s election to Parliament – regrouped in Calunda, some fifty 
kilometres from the Zambian border, where they began to be trained by the Portuguese 
military as a counter-guerrilla force to be used against the Zambia-based insurgents of the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). Although smaller and less effective, 
the Zambian mayouth (as the Lunda trainees became known locally) were not unlike the 
Flèches Noires, the contingent of former Katangese gendarmes whom the Portuguese were 
then starting to employ against Angolan nationalist bases inside the Congo and who would 
later form the kernel of the Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC).
26
 
Throughout 1966, MP Japau – who still supported Tshombe’s dreams of ethnic 
restitution and who appears to have became increasingly convinced that only military action 
could unseat UNIP from power – kept in touch with Samawino and did his best to provide the 
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mayouth with fresh recruits from Mwinilunga. Kaunda hinted darkly at these subversive 
movements when he presided over the installation of a new, UNIP-sponsored Kanongesha in 
June 1966. After warning the new senior chief to “keep in line,” the President “said he was 
keeping certain trouble-makers in the district under ‘very careful watch. I warn them that they 
will be dealt with very very severely if the occasion should arise.’”
27
 At the end of the year, 
Japau’s activities were openly denounced in the wake of the first recorded mayouth’s 
incursion into Zambia. The people who attacked Musumali village in the early hours of 24 
December, leaving one man dead and 31 spent military cartridges on the ground, were not 
Angolan soldiers, but “members of ANC who are living in Angola and some people who Mr. 
John Japau recruited.” The local UNIP’s regional secretary concluded his worried missive by 




It was only a matter of time now before Japau was arrested and charged with high 
treason. The ensuing trial in Ndola’s High Court in July-August 1967 revealed both the 
solidity of Japau’s links with the Lunda exiles in Angola and the depth of his hostility to the 
post-colonial political dispensation. The most telling passages of his “New Plan for North 
Western Rhodesia To Join Lunda and Angola” – a text which Japau wrote between January 
and October 1964 and which the director of public prosecution sought to employ against him 
during the court proceedings – read as follows:  
 
“Lunda Empire is strongly opposing to the Zambia Government which has taken over from N. Rhodesia 
Government which is being run by a foreign Prime Minister … The Lunda Empire … does not want to see that 
the missionaries, settlers and all the white men whose homes have been set up here to be deported … by the new 
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Government which is predominantly communist … We are to join together with the people of Angola and 




Japau emerged victorious only because his defence was able to demonstrate that the initial 
statements of prosecution witnesses had been extracted under duress. And though he acquitted 
Japau, Mr. Justice Evans was “‘left with the suspicion that [he] and others have been engaged 




After his close escape, Japau found it prudent to sever his direct connection with the 
mayouth and to devote more and more attention to Congress affairs in Lusaka.
31
 But if Japau 
was prepared temporarily to sideline his plans to destabilize Kaunda’s government by military 
means, Samawino and his Portuguese backers were not. On the night between 26 and 27 
November 1968, a mere three weeks before the Zambian general elections, the mayouth 
reminded Zambia and the world of their continuing existence with their biggest yet show of 
strength. Three villages of UNIP’s supporters near the capital of Kanongesha were razed to 
the ground and the local UNIP’s constituency secretary murdered. About one thousand 
terrified villagers sought refuge in the Mwinilunga boma. Among them was the senior chief, 
whom the mayouth viewed as a traitor and who may well have been the ultimate target of the 
attack.
32
 About one week later, as the Zambian army and police frantically combed the bush 
around Kanongesha’s, Samawino and his boys struck again, burning down 12 huts in 
Sambao’s village and seriously wounding the son of its headman.
33
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Samawino had undoubtedly succeeded in bringing home to the UNIP’s government 
the vulnerability of the Zambian border. But most Mwinilunga residents were clearly 
outraged by the attack and registered their dissatisfaction by abandoning en masse the ANC 
on polling day. Moreover, the attack provided the ruling party with the excuse it needed to 
clamp down ANC activities in the district and to justify the arrest of the party’s remaining 
local officials.
34
 With the ANC all but extinguished in Mwinilunga and local support for their 
destabilization campaign dwindling rapidly, the mayouth must have entered a period of crisis, 
from which they sought to emerge with a renewed incursion into Zambian territory. In the 
early hours of 16 May 1971, Samawino and his followers attacked a paramilitary camp in the 
proximity of Kanongesha’s village, murdering one policeman. Police returned fire and killed 
four of the guerrillas. “The attackers then went on the rampage, ambushed a bus travelling 
from Kelenge to Mwinilunga and fired on it, killing three passengers and wounding four 
seriously and 11 slightly.”
35
 The dynamic of the attack suggests that isolation and lack of 
clear political direction were transforming the mayouth into a small, inward-looking, 
mercenary force, the survival of which depended solely on the goodwill of the Portuguese and 
their willingness to deploy it against forays into Angola by the MPLA.
36
 But the imposition of 
a one-party state in Zambia at the end of 1972 and the violent opposition which it arose 
among some top officials of the banned United Party (see below) gave the Lunda exiles a new 
lease of life and an opportunity to recast their political and military strategy. 
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The National Context: UNIP’s Discontents and the Drive towards the  
One-Party State (1966-73) 
 
 
While Japau continued to operate within the framework of the ANC – whose president is 
likely to have turned a blind eye to his subversive activities – other opponents of UNIP in the 
mid-1960s came to doubt the effectiveness of Nkumbula’s leadership and gave birth to an 
alternative political organization. Launched at the beginning of 1966 by such ANC defectors 
as Mufaya Mumbuna, a Lozi courtier and the MP for Mazabuka, and Berrings Lombe, the 
ANC’s former national secretary, the United Front (rechristened the United Party [UP] in 
May of the same year) became a force to be reckoned with once it attracted a number of UNIP 
officials who criticised what they characterised as their party’s neglect of Barotseland and the 
North-Western Provinces and its more general inability to match popular expectations of 
independence.
37
 The first to leave were Dickson Chikulo, UNIP’s former education secretary 
and the MP for Lukulu, and his erstwhile deputy, Adamson Mushala. A few days after his 
resignation from the party, Chikulo accused UNIP of not being truthful to the motto “one 
Zambia, one nation.” “‘If this Government wants unity’” – he charged in the National 
Assembly – “‘then it should share the national wealth equally. Nothing has been done for 
North-Western and Barotse Provinces.’”
38
  Mushala, the UP’s deputy national secretary from 
the end of May, put it in broader terms.  
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“It was true freedom that the people fought for which is not the meaning of the freedom UNIP wants to bring in 





Specifically Lozi feelings of disaffection with the post-Independence dispensation 
grew more intense between the end of 1966 and 1967 as a result of the government’s ban on 
the labour recruiting activities of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in 
Barotseland and the coeval defeat sustained by Lozi candidates in UNIP’s central committee 
elections.
40
 More high-profile resignations from UNIP followed suit. William Chipango, who 
had opposed the central committee’s decision not to reconfirm him as mayor of Livingstone 
in September 1966 and had spent several months in detention for his troubles, joined the UP 
in September 1967 and became its national organising secretary shortly thereafter.
41
 But the 
UP’s biggest catch was undoubtedly Nalumino Mundia, a hero of UNIP’s independence 
struggle, who had been forced to relinquish his ministerial post for alleged malpractices over 
government loans at the beginning of 1966 and whose subsequent clash with the UNIP 
leadership had led to his expulsion from the party in March 1967.
42
 Mundia replaced 
Mumbuna as the UP’s national president early in 1968. 
Besides its strong regional bias, the UP’s political programme was not significantly 
different from that of the ANC. Pledged to the defence of multi-party democracy against 
UNIP’s authoritarian temptations, the UP espoused a loose right-wing agenda, the clearest 
expressions of which were its commitment to individual economic initiative and resolve to 
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establish friendly relationships with the white regimes of southern Africa.
43
 However, what 
differentiated the two parties was the degree of militancy and enthusiasm with which they set 
about weakening UNIP’s position. Less encumbered than the ANC by a studiously cultivated 
moderate image, the UP displayed a clear determination to expand outside its original ethnic 
constituencies and to physically confront UNIP’s predictably violent reaction. The UP’s 
attempt to gain a foothold in the Copperbelt in the early part of 1968 plunged the industrial 
heartland of the country into a vicious spiral of inter-party violence and prompted President 
Kaunda to bring the party’s life to a premature end.
44
 After branding the UP’s “activities a 
danger to national security, peace and order,” Kaunda employed the emergency powers vested 
in him to ban the party and “rusticate” most members of its executive.
45
 
UNIP’s precipitous action presented Nkumbula with the chance to (re)incorporate 
former UP supporters into his own party. Within the space of a few months, and after a round 
of successful negotiations with Mundia and other UP detainees, most members of the banned 
party were persuaded to join the ANC.
46
 The merger between the two parties accounts for the 
comparative success of the ANC in the general elections of December 1968, when, to the 
dismay of UNIP and the surprise of many foreign observers, Nkumbula’s party managed to 
double its parliamentary contingent by supplementing its traditionally safe constituencies in 
the Southern and Central Provinces with as many as eight out of the eleven Barotseland seats. 
The results – gloated E. Mungoni Liso, the ANC’s national secretary – showed that it was 
“not possible to have a one-party state in Zambia” and that UNIP’s much-heralded ambition 
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of effecting this transformation through electoral (as opposed to legislative) means was 
destined to remain a pious intention.
47
  
Upon their release in 1969, Mundia and Chipango were appointed as the ANC’s 
deputy president and administrative secretary, respectively. Under their leadership, former UP 
officials and MPs in the ANC retained a distinctive identity and considerable room for 
independent manoeuvre – mainly, though not exclusively, in their home-areas in Barotseland 
and the Kaonde-speaking districts of the North-Western Province, now under the sway of 
ANC Provincial President Mushala. Livingstone, where Chipango and his right-hand man, 
Timothy Kalimbwe, resided, became the centre of what the then provincial minister of state 
called a “terrorist campaign unleashed by the ANC and ex-UP members.” With rumours of 
“military camps” being established by the ANC in nearby farms, “morale” among local 
supporters of UNIP was “very, very low indeed.”
48
 As inter-party clashes marred the life of 
the town throughout 1969, Chipango and Kalimbwe succeeded in making contact with 
representatives of the South African military intelligence stationed across the Zambezi, in the 
Caprivi Strip.
49
 Although their request for financial aid was turned down by the South 
Africans, Kaunda may not have been unaware of their movements when he took the decision 
to impose a total ban on the ANC in Livingstone district in February 1970.
50
  
Whatever its ultimate motive, the ban convinced the ANC’s leaders that UNIP’s 
limited toleration for internal dissent was a thing of the past and that the ruling party had now 
resolved swiftly to move in the direction of a one-party state, regardless of the 1968 electoral 
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results and the support that their organization continued to receive in parts of the country. 
Nkumbula embarked on what he would later call his “last battle” equipped with real 
determination and solid arguments.
51
 As early as 1966, in a lecture delivered to the University 
of Zambia, he had equated the one-party state to “dictatorship, fascism, tyranny and 
corruption. The moment the right to oppose Government is taken away from the subjects of 
the state, misery and terror will follow. The rule of Law can be ruled out.”
52
 Between 1970 
and 1971, with a split within UNIP gathering momentum, and with unmistakable signs of 
mounting popular frustration at the slow pace of post-colonial “development” in much of 
Zambia, Nkumbula and the ANC were able to invigorate their ideological opposition with the 
charge that the proposed one-party state was the last-ditch resource of a discredited and 
fundamentally weakened political class, rather than the legislative expression of the 
overwhelming popular support for UNIP that Kaunda claimed. Liso, for one, reminded ANC 
officials that “Africa’s leaders” tended to discover the virtues of the one-party state once they 
“realised that more and more opposition [was] building against them.” 
 
This is because they haven’t got the guts to stand up to the challenges of the opposition. They feel their highly 
placed positions in society are threatened while they still want to retain them. So while they become more 
oppressive to their opponents, real or imaginary, they preach a certain amount of righteousness – “Unity, one 




UNIP’s leaders – Nkumbula wrote in June 1970 – behaved like “frightened 
animals.”
54
 The real extent of both their fears and authoritarian inclinations became evident in 
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August 1971, when a highly influential group of UNIP defectors, led by Simon Kapwepwe, 
launched the United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP had its origins in the ethno-regional 
tensions that had come to the fore during the disputed UNIP central committee elections of 
1967. Kapwepwe’s election as UNIP and Zambia’s Vice President had sparked opposition, 
particularly amongst Easterners, who feared what they characterised as “Bemba dominance” 
of UNIP. Partly, these divisions can be understood as a reflection of rising discontent in much 
of Zambia at the ruling party’s perceived failure to deliver on expectations of post-
Independence transformation.
55
 As Szeftel pointed out, colonial economic underdevelopment 
and the consequent lack of domestic private capital made the post-colonial Zambian state the 
focus of accumulation for the aspirant bourgeoisie.
56
 Attainment of (or exclusion from) a 
position within UNIP and/or the expanding state bureaucracy could enable (or prevent) the 
acquisition of capital for business, self-enrichment and clientelistic mobilization. Politicians, 
under pressure to deliver development to their areas of origin, defended themselves by 
accusations of regional bias in the allocation of resources, which they in turn related to the 
skewed provincial representation in the UNIP leadership.  
Following Kapwepwe’s resignation as Zambian Vice President in 1969 after threats of 
a no-confidence vote by Eastern-based UNIP leaders, many Bemba-speakers in the party 
became convinced they were being systematically excluded from party positions and began to 
organise an underground opposition organisation. Following the public launch of the UPP two 
years later, Kapwepwe, despite his supposed left-leaning radicalism, quickly made common 
cause with the politically more conservative Nkumbula, who shared his offices with the new 
party. The potential for an alliance between the two opposition parties meant that UNIP could 
find itself a minority party for the first time, raising the prospect of its defeat in the next 
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general election, due in 1973. The UPP attracted support not only from the Bemba heartland 
of the Northern Province, but also amongst organised workers and small businessmen in the 
economically strategic Copperbelt, as well as the intelligentsia and radical students in 
Lusaka.
57
 The vast majority of UPP leaders were detained within weeks of the party’s launch. 
Despite the continuing intimidation of the UPP’s members and supporters that mirrored the 
earlier repression of the UP, the party was able to compete in a series of by-elections in 
December 1971. While the ANC demonstrated its enduring popularity by holding four of its 
six seats in a situation hardly conducive to open campaigning,
58
 Kapwepwe won the Mufulira 
West seat despite being prevented from touring the mining constituency. After an assault on 
Kapwepwe the following month, violent clashes between UPP and UNIP supporters provided 
the excuse for Kaunda to ban the party in February 1972, heralding the declaration of the one-
party state.  
After the banning of the UPP, and despite the ANC’s robust parliamentary and legal 
opposition to the planned constitutional move between 1971 and 1972, it became clear to a 
number of former UP’s officials that the leaders of the party in which they had found a safe 
heaven were not prepared to adopt what to them appeared to be the only viable strategy to 
stop the one-party juggernaut: armed insurgency with the backing of UNIP’s regional 
enemies. Unlike Mundia, Mushala – who was still based in Mufumbwe as the ANC’s 
president in the North-Western Province and who was by now in touch with the South 
African intelligence – decided to boycott the negotiations over the one-party state into which 
Nkumbula was finally drawn by Kaunda during the latter part of 1972. At about this time, 
Mushala visited Caprivi. However, when, on 11 January 1973, the Zambian police, alarmed 
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by rumours of Kalimbwe’s recent recruiting activities, closed in on Chipango, it was to 





Regional Politics: Zambia, Portugal and South Africa (1969-76) 
 
From the late 1960s, South African and Portuguese military intelligence regarded Zambia as 
the primary base of regional national liberation movements and a major threat to the long-term 
survival of the Apartheid state. Angolan, Mozambican, Zimbabwean, Namibian and (to a 
lesser extent) South African guerrillas were operating out of rear bases within Zambia. In 
1970-71, South Africa’s Consul General in Luanda repeatedly warned his superiors in Pretoria 
that Portuguese rule in Angola would ultimately collapse in the wake of nationalist aggression 
– an event that might herald the end of white minority rule in southern Africa as a whole. The 
only solution – he believed – was to take the war to the nationalists’ bases, inevitably leading 
to open conflict with Zambia itself.
60
 
The aforementioned contacts between the South African military intelligence and 
former leaders of the Zambian UP should be understood in this context. Growing links with 
the Portuguese intelligence police, the General-Directorate of Security (DGS) (former 
International and State Defence Police (PIDE)), brought the presence of the mayouth in 
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Calunda to the attention of the South Africans. At some point in 1972, General Hendrik van 
den Bergh, head of South Africa’s Bureau of State Security (BOSS), conceived a plan to 
provide military training to Zambians mustered by Mushala. These forces were to be used to 
destabilise Zambia, thereby persuading Kaunda to end his support of Angolan and 
Zimbabwean nationalists, the South African ANC, and the Namibian SWAPO.
61
 According to 
Jan Breytenbach, whose Number 1 Reconnaissance Commando (Recces) was initially 
entrusted with the task of training the Zambian dissidents in guerrilla warfare, this operation 
was authorised at the highest level; he recalls being present at a meeting in which South 
African Prime Minister John Vorster gave his telephonic approval to bringing the group to 
Caprivi.
62
 Early in 1973, Mushala appears to have travelled between Calunda, Luanda and 
Caprivi, working closely with both DGS and BOSS. The relationship, however, was by no 
means harmonious. As suggested above, after 1971, the mayouth seem to have been restricted 
to defensive operations against MPLA forays into Angola. Mushala’s desire to take the fight 




With Mushala’s closest partisans temporarily gathered in Calunda, the first Zambian 
trainees to reach Caprivi before the end of January 1973 were a contingent of “one hundred 
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Lozi” under the leadership of Kalimbwe.
64
 But by the time Kalimbwe’s men arrived in 
Namibia, South Africa’s relations with Zambia were changing. South Africa now shared (and 
indeed helped influence) the United States’ assessment that the Angolan nationalist 
organisations, which had been forced back from their earlier advances in 1972-73, would not 
be able to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule in the immediate future.
65
 More urgent in South 
African and Zambian official minds was the need to settle the Rhodesian conflict. Kaunda and 
Vorster had first exchanged letters discussing regional political conflicts, and that in Rhodesia 
in particular, in 1968.
66
 Vorster’s exposure of this correspondence in 1971 had worsened the 
tension between the two countries and led to a temporary breaking off of covert diplomatic 
contacts. The 1972 Pearce Commission increased international pressure on Rhodesia’s UDI 
regime to reach a settlement that would incorporate the Zambia-based Zimbabwean 
nationalists, who were then having a significant military impact for the first time.
67
 Rhodesia’s 
unilateral closure of its border with Zambia in January 1973 was lifted after pressure on Ian 
Smith from Vorster. Although it chose to keep its own frontier sealed as a political statement, 
the Zambian government – disturbed by deepening conflicts within the Zimbabwean liberation 
movement and frightened by the likely economic impact of the border closure at a time of 
declining profitability of the strategic copper mining industry – was by now desperate to bring 
the Rhodesian crisis to an end. For their part, Vorster and van den Bergh came to believe that 
rapid resolution of the Rhodesian conflict would greatly reduce international pressure on 
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 Kaunda encouraged them in this belief by reiterating the distinctions 
drawn in the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, in which South Africa, unlike Rhodesia, had been 
recognised as an “independent sovereign state.”
69
  By mid-1973, South Africa was making 
significant efforts to strengthen diplomatic and military contacts with Zambia, seeking to 
utilise (reluctant) British go-betweens to bolster their own covert links.
70
  
In this context of embryonic détente, South Africa’s hosting and training of the 
Zambian dissidents became something of an embarrassment.
71
 In November 1973, van den 
Bergh appears to have sacrificed the one hundred Zambian trainees on the altar of regional 
diplomacy. During Mushala’s detention by the Portuguese, the Lozi contingent was apparently 
returned to Zambia, only to find Zambian armed forces waiting for it. Most of these men were 
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killed on the spot, with the rest being immediately detained.
72
 Kalimbwe managed to escape 
back into Caprivi, but subsequently returned to Zambia in circumstances that remain unclear. 




Shortly before the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Mushala’s immediate followers 
were transferred from Calunda to Luanda by their DGS handlers. Mushala’s widow, Rejoice, 
explains this decision by pointing to the need to protect them from the renewed activism of 
Angolan nationalist forces.
74
 However, it is equally likely that by relocating the leading 
Zambian guerrillas, the Portuguese sought to ensure closer control over their movements. As a 
result of the coup, Mushala’s supporters in Calunda were granted a form of political asylum in 
Caprivi in August-September 1974. The agreement stated that the Zambian exiles “will be 
used as the Republic of South Africa needs them,” but that they will “not take part in any 
undermining activity against Zambia.” Mushala reluctantly accepted these conditions, but only 
23 of his male partisans, together with 43 women and children, followed his lead. This group 
was transported to Caprivi on a Portuguese military flight on 17 November 1974.
75
 The 
Zambians who remained in Calunda appear to have eventually forsaken the military option 
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There is substantial disagreement regarding the extent of military training provided to 
the Calunda contingent in Caprivi. Whilst official South African documents claimed that 
training was limited to the defence of the “Zulu” camp in which they resided, Wele states that 
Mushala’s men were instructed in the use of rifles, hand grenades, bazookas and machine 
guns.
77
 He also suggests, however, that the group was in practice limited to occasional 
incursions into Zambian territory to lay landmines and to recruit a few villagers to the cause.
78
 
Given the divisions between and within South African military and political intelligence at 
this time, it would be unsurprising if the Recces in Caprivi offered Mushala and his men 
significantly more support than their distrusted political superiors in Pretoria had officially 
approved.
79
 Breytenbach, whose sympathies were undoubtedly with Mushala, met him on 
only one occasion, during which he gave him a copy of The War of the Flea, a popular study 
of the tactics of guerrilla warfare and their successful application in Vietnam and elsewhere.
80
 
In the wake of the Portuguese coup, Kaunda shared South Africa’s fears that an 
MPLA victory in Angola would create a dangerous and destabilising Communist presence in 
Southern Africa.
81
 Late in 1974, at a time when the União Nacional para a Independência 
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Total de Angola (UNITA) was receiving direct military assistance from South Africa, the US 
channelled covert support to Jonas Savimbi’s organisation through its embassy in Lusaka.
82
 
During this period of significant cooperation between Zambia and South Africa, 
representatives of both countries met regularly in Pretoria and Lusaka. These entrevues 
culminated in the unsuccessful Victoria Falls Bridge talks between Smith and the 
Zimbabwean nationalist leaders in August 1975.
83
  
It is therefore unsurprising that Mushala’s constant requests for South African 
assistance in his fight against the Zambian government were denied. As a secret South 
African military intelligence brief subsequently reported, this led to open conflict with his 
handlers and a dramatic return to Zambia that challenges received wisdom regarding South 
African support for Mushala: 
 
After he realised that he will not got any assistance and may not continue with an operation from South Africa, 
he suggested that his only option was to go back unarmed and get assistance from the local communities … It 
seemed as if Mushala was not going to abide to the orders and he and his traditional headman [presumably, his 
“medicine-man,” Yotam Chimwanga] were, as a precaution, separated from his followers. Mushala and his 
headman were held in custody at another piece of land from 23 April until the end of November 1975. When 
Mushala promised to forget about his plans and comply with the conditions, he and his traditional leaders were 
sent back to his people. This happened on 29 November 1975. On the night of 7-8 December Mushala and 11 of 
his followers ran away from the camp. The following morning it was realised that somebody had broken into the 
warehouse and stolen 10 guns and a small amount of ammunition. It was generally accepted that Mushala was 
responsible for the theft and that they had returned to Zambia. On the morning of 21 December 1975 it was 
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discovered that another 9 men ran away during the night. No weapons were missing during this incident … After 




The same report notes that South Africa unofficially informed Zambian authorities of 
the escape of the group. Despite this, Kaunda would later accuse South Africa of having sent 
Mushala and his men to destabilise the country.
85
 It is noteworthy, however, that the charge 
was made not at the time of Mushala’s escape (when both countries were still tacitly 
cooperating in seeking to prevent a MPLA success in Angola), but rather in June 1976, by 
which time the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe détente initiative had broken down and the MPLA’s 
victory in Angola was secure. There were certainly suspicions that Mushala might have been 
assisted by elements of the South African military sympathetic to his cause and hostile to 
BOSS. The following month, Pik Botha, South Africa’s representative at the United Nations, 
was forced to concede that Mushala and his followers had been brought to the Caprivi Strip 
two years earlier, but described this as a “humanitarian gesture.”
86
 On that occasion, Botha 





The War of the Flea (1976-90) 
 
Following their escape from Caprivi, Mushala and his small group of around twenty 
supporters trekked north to their home-areas in the North-Western Province. They went first to 
Mufumbwe, then to the dense forests of Mulumbwanshika, to the north of the Kafue National 
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Park. From January 1976, the Zambian authorities began to receive a steady flow of reports of 
armed robbery and shootouts with local police. In March of the same year, Mushala was in 
Senior Chief Kanongesha’s area, where his forces burned the house of a Rabani Chitenga of 
Matafwali village.
88
 By May, when Minister of Home Affairs Aaron Milner reported the 
capture of Mushala’s base camp, 14 people had been killed (six of whom were poachers 
mistaken by the police as members of the rebel group).
89
 In July, Mushala’s men burned one 
village near Matushi and one near Mufumbwe (four civilian casualties), clashed with the 




In September 1976, three months after Kaunda’s press conference linking him to South 
Africa, Mushala issued a statement denying that he was receiving external logistical support 
but asserting that, under his rule, Zambia would adopt an anti-Communist stance and open 
diplomatic relations with South Africa and Rhodesia. Mushala also claimed that his group was 
targeting government officials, not civilians, in its military actions.
91
 Despite UNIP’s 
characterisation of Mushala’s followers as mere “bandits,” the rebels appear to have taken 
distinctively political actions during this period, for example issuing written propaganda 
against the one-party state in the Mufumbwe area in as early as February 1976.
92
 When, at 
some point in 1977, Mushala returned to Mwinilunga and held a secret meeting with the then 
Kanongesha, Sailas Kamonda, he explicitly told the latter that his wish was to contest the 
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presidency of Zambia against Kaunda in competitive elections. He also explained that he was 
fighting to address the marginalisation of the North-Western Province and its peoples.
93
 
Mushala’s programme cannot be summarised into a single coherent agenda for 
political change. Indeed, the rebellion’s capacity to deliver a range of widely different 
messages to potential supporters was, like other rural movements, a significant part of its 
mobilising power. Mushala did, however, produce a “Plan of Action” that amounted to an 
alternative vision for the organisation and governance of independent Zambia.
94
 The “Plan” 
proposed to replace UNIP’s “atheistic” government with a federal multi-party democracy – 
the “United States of Zambia” (USZ) – consisting of sixteen states, each officially headed by a 
paramount chief. Considerable powers would be placed in the hands of traditional rulers, with 
“power in the government … so diffused among different persons so much so that no one 
person shall be able to make dictatorial laws and impose them on others.” Economic 
development would lead to the construction of more houses, schools, roads, hospitals, and 
universities, funded by the opening of new mines. Fundamental human rights would be 
observed, and an independent press and radio permitted. Churches would be “called upon to 
play a leading role in nation building of institutions of learning without government 
interference.” Trading with Rhodesia and South Africa would be sanctioned, and the USZ 
would adopt a “policy of alignment with the western world.” Free enterprise and economic 
competition would be supported, state-owned mines, banks and other institutions privatised, 
and farming encouraged with the concession of the right to buy and sell land.
 95
 
In April 1976, it was reported that villagers were, on orders from Mushala, tearing 
down the posters of a UNIP councillor in Musonko’s village. The district governor for 
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 The extent to which the “Plan of Action” was practically used during Mushala’s campaigning activities 




Kabompo pointedly remarked in his account of this incident that “Mushala could have been 
caught if the Zambia Army had been supplied at this time [i.e. informed] of the situation by 
bush hunting him.”
96
 The suggestion of a lack of public cooperation with the authorities was 
strengthened to imply active collusion with the enemy by Bautis Kapulu, the member of 
UNIP’s central committee for the North-Western Province, who wrote to Kaunda that 
“Mushala [knew] very well the movements of our security forces including number plates of 
the trucks that [were] following him.”
97
 And a few months later, the same Kapulu admitted 
that because Mushala knew “the area very well and also the people, it [was] very easy for him 
to organise in this particular areas and be able to amass support from the local population.”
98
 
By the end of 1976, 16 people had been arrested for allegedly supplying Mushala with food 
and/or information.
99
 Distrust amongst the security forces of the peoples of the North-Western 
Province, particularly the Kaonde, led to violence and brutality against civilians suspected of 
sheltering or supporting the rebels.
100
 Mushala himself apparently believed in the principles of 
guerrilla warfare expounded in The War of the Flea. In an address to his grandly-named 
“national security council and defence mobilisation council” at his headquarters in the 
Mulumbwanashika forest, Mushala warned that  
 
                                                 
96
 D. Kalepa, “Report to the MCC NWP on Mushala Terrorists Movement,” Kabompo, 1 June 1976, UNIP 
16/6/30, UNIPA. 
97
 B. Kapulu to K.D. Kaunda, Solwezi, 11 June 1976, UNIP 16/6/30, UNIPA. 
98
 B. Kapulu to UNIP’s Secretary General, Solwezi, 16 August 1976, UNIP 16/6/30, UNIPA. 
99
 Wele, Kaunda and Mushala, 97. 
100
 See, e.g., N. Mundia to E. Mudenda, Solwezi, 11 August 1976, UNIP 16/6/30, UNIPA. By this time, having 
made his peace with Kaunda, Mundia was serving as cabinet minister for the North-Western Province.   
 31 
“Those who doubt our support should realise that we are capable of carrying a successful guerrilla war for even a 
thousand … years. Without people’s support our survival up to the present would have been very difficult. I do 




In 1977, the capture or killing of some members of the original rebel group, including 
Mushala’s brother and his “medicine-man,” Yotam Chimwanga, significantly reduced the 
guerrillas’ activities; they never again reached the previous year’s degree of disruption. 
Accounts of Mushala’s deeds, however, depicted an increased level of violence by the 
“gang.”
102
 It was reported at this time that agricultural production in the province had been 
adversely affected, for Mushala’s presence made people afraid to go to the fields to farm.
103
 
Somewhat contradictorily, accusations of tacit or open support for his activities also became 
more common. Despite the restriction of his operations primarily to the North-Western 
Province, Mushala’s frame of reference remained both national and regional. In April 1978, he 
wrote to Savimbi, arguing that since UNITA and his own “Democratic Supreme Council” 
(DSC) shared an anti-Communist perspective, they should cooperate along the lines of 
NATO. But Mushala’s request for supplies of ammunition and mines was apparently not 
met.
104
 Although Mushala instructed the chiefs to direct their subjects not to vote for UNIP 
and Kaunda in the 1978 one-party state elections, UNIP’s fears that Mushala might disrupt the 
elections in the province were not realised.
105
 Nevertheless, in 1979 there were renewed 
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rumours of localised famine.
106
 And in 1980, UNIP’s failure to recruit members in the North-
Western Province was officially attributed to the danger of violent reprisals from the gang.
107
 
Mushala mounted a campaign of recruitment and propaganda against the one-party 
state. He and leading members of the band would travel to villages in Kabompo, Mwinilunga 
and Solwezi districts, and to the shantytowns of the nearby Copperbelt. They would hold 
secret nocturnal meetings on the edge of the bush, aimed at those who were discontented with 
Kaunda and his government.
108
 Mushala’s lieutenants utilised the familiar discourse of 
regionally-based thwarted expectations:  
 
“Money from Kansanshi and Kalengwa mines [in the North-Western Province] is not spent on tarring Mutanda-
Chavuma road … All this revenue from these mines goes somewhere else. Why are we neglected? … the MPs 




Although some villagers would flee as the rebels approached, others would stay and engage in 
discussion. In this way, Mushala’s following grew to a fluctuating force of between 150 and 
500 “soldiers” (many of them were actually unarmed) by the late 1970s. The guerrillas would 
normally camp in small semi-permanent bases, growing some of their own food and acquiring 
additional foodstuffs and other necessities by trading with villagers, to whom they offered 
attractive opportunities in a context of economic decline. The rebels would poach ivory and 
ask the villagers to sell it; the proceeds would then be split equally between them.
110
  
Other guerrillas were recruited to the cause by more forceful methods. Alex 
Saimbwende was effectively kidnapped in 1977. By 1979, he had risen to become Mushala’s 
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second-in-command in the DSC. Today, Saimbwende emphasises both the brutality of the 
one-party state and the allegedly “Communist” orientation of the UNIP government. He also 
recalls that lack of hospitals, roads, education and other social infrastructure fed people’s 
malcontent with UNIP. Such materialist ideas ran alongside a profound belief in the power of 
Chimwanga and his successors’ medicine, the distribution of which Mushala appears to have 
tightly controlled. Saimbwende says he personally witnessed three occasions when the bullets 
of Zambian Army soldiers fell away from the body of those wearing charms, carried in a 
pouch around the neck. Finally, he stresses the importance of bush training to the guerrillas, 
reporting that the rebels were trained by those who had themselves received instruction from 
Portuguese and/or South African soldiers. Saimbwende’s descriptions are notable for the 
absence of effective UNIP or state authority in the remote villages of the North-Western 
Province. Local UNIP’s officials were amongst those who came and listened to Mushala and 
his propagandists. Mushala also contacted many local chiefs; whilst few were prepared to 




Despite UNIP’s hysteria, lack of outside support ensured that the Mushala group 
remained small and poorly armed. In November 1982, Adamson was cornered and killed by 
Zambia’s security forces.
112
 By this time, Mushala’s reputation for trickery and magical 
disappearances was such that his dead body was publicly displayed, with photographs of the 
corpse printed in local and international newspapers. After the leader’s death, most of his 
erstwhile supporters returned to their villages, reducing the band’s number from 
approximately 160 to 26. Saimbwende, now president of the DSC, wanted to end the struggle, 
but was convinced by others that they would be killed if they surrendered. Instead, they used 
their bush skills to survive in remote rural camps until 1990, when Saimbwende was 
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eventually invited by Kaunda to give himself up to the authorities, in exchange for an amnesty 





Saimbwende’s amnesty was one of a large number that was granted by President Kaunda in 
mid-1990, as he prepared to accept the return of multi-party democracy, which would shortly 
thereafter end his 27 years in power. Writing in The Post newspaper in October 2004, Kaunda 
himself did not question the customary catch-all description of Mushala as “funded by the 
Boers to destabilise us. Thank God, we walloped him.”
113
 For many in the North-Western 
Province, however, the election of the rebel leader’s son, Berts Mushala, as an independent 
MP for Mufumbwe in 1996 was an indication of the enduring appeal of his father’s challenge 
to the failure of the Lusaka-based government to address the concerns of the peoples of what 
remains a remote and poverty-stricken part of Zambia. Berts’ popularity was noted by the 
ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which in 2001 made him its candidate 
for the same constituency. The MMD implemented many of the policies that Mushala had 
advocated in his “Plan of Action”: privatisation, the right to buy and sell land, an increased 
role for faith-based organisations in the provision of social infrastructure and a substantially 
reduced role for the state. While in no way inspired by Mushala’s thinking, the MMD’s 
agenda made it viable for its local officials to establish a linkage between their party and the 
rebel’s memory – a linkage aptly symbolised by the appointment of Berts Mushala as minister 
for the North-Western Province early in 2002.
114
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By mid-2005, when the younger Mushala was removed from his post, the economic 
marginality of the province was apparently being transformed. The opening of new local 
copper mines and extensive prospecting for copper and other minerals coincided with 
unprecedentedly high international mineral prices. This led to widespread speculation that the 
area could, in the words of President Levy Mwanawasa, become the “new Copperbelt.”
115
 
Plans are afoot for new rail links between the recently inaugurated mines and Solwezi, the 
provincial capital, and the Copperbelt and Angola.
116
 Yet questions have inevitably arisen as 
to whether the supposed provincial boom will actually benefit local people. North-westerners 
living in the vicinity of the new Lumwana mine pointed to the removal of copper ore to 
refineries outside the province and were sceptical that any lasting advantage would flow to 
them. Indeed, Berts’ demotion and his replacement by a Nyanja-speaking outsider from the 
Eastern Province were perceived as signs that the province’s resources were now too 
important to be left to its people to benefit from.
117
 Strong and potentially exclusionary forms 
of local identity; a cynicism bred from decades of broken developmental promises and 
imperfect integration into the post-colonial state; a fundamental weakness vis-à-vis the 
vagaries of the international political and economic conjuncture – the complex combination of 
local, national and regional forces by which Mushala was made (and unmade) continues to 
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